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1.  SUMMARY 
Carnap's  continuum  of  inductive  methods  (Carnap,  1952)  has  been 
considered, by himself and others, as a proof for the claim that the intuitive 
concept of rational degree of belief can be explicated, at least with respect to 
simple  situations,  in  a  satisfactory  way.  At  the  same  time  it  has  been 
considered as new evidence for the intuitive feeling that such an explication 
would  only be possible  for singular  (or, individual) hypotheses but not for 
universal hypotheses. In particular, it was felt that it would not be possible to 
generalize  Carn~Lp's continuum  in  an  acceptable  way  so  that  Carnap's 
continuum appears as an extreme special case. 
In  this  paper  it  will  be shown that this particular conjecture is false and 
that, consequently, the general conjecture is also  false. The requirements for 
an  acceptable  generalization  will  be  stated  precisely  and,  in  view  of the 
literature  on  tiffs  subject,  we  have  the  strong  conviction  that  these 
requirements will  generally be admitted to be necessary and sufficient from 
the finitary (inductive) point of view. 
The generalized continuum is not new, however. It is essentially contained 
in Hintikka's (1966) a-X-system  and it is essentially equivalent to the class of 
systems  which  have  recently  been  introduced by I-Iintikka  and  Niiniluoto 
(1976).  The main  technical result  of this article is the proof that the latter 
class  of  system,;  is  equivalent  to  a  particular  subsystem  of  Hintikka's 
combined system. Hintikka and Niiniluoto could already conclude that it was 
possible to treat universal hypotheses in a fundamentally acceptable way. The 
equivalence theorem enables us to specify precisely why and in what sense we 
are  justified  to  talk  about  the  generalization  of  Carnap's  continuum. 
Moreover  it  shows  that  this  generalization  is  axiomatically  as  well  as 
technically as simple as ever could be expected. 
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2.  NOTATIONAL AND TERMINOLOGICAL CONVENTIONS 
Carnap  has  presented  his  continuum  of inductive  methods  completely in 
terms  of the  application he intended:  the sentences of a monadic predicate 
language.  But  this  continuum  can  also be described in purely mathematical 
terms, without reference to any particular application. The same holds for the 
systems that  will be discussed in this paper. However, to make the intuitive 
understanding easier we shall use a terminology based on a very general type 
of application, including Carnap's favourite one, viz. the terminology used in 
experimental  situations.  This approach  enables  us moreover to simplify the 
symbolization at several points where misunderstandings are unlikely to arise. 
Let  there  be  described  a  repeatable  experiment  with  K  (2 <K<~) 
elementary outcomes  Q1, Q2, • • •,  Q~  constituting the set T. Subsets of T 
will  also  be  called  outcomes.  Performance  of  n  experiments  leads  to  an 
ordered  sequence  of elementary outcomes en,  which  is  an  element  of the 
Cartesian  product  T n  and  which  may  be  used  as  evidence  in  relation  to 
hypotheses concerning new experiments. In every particular context it will be 
clear whether, and in what way, the dummy expression for zero evidence, eo, 
may be omitted or inserted. 
Let ni(en) ,  or simply n i  if e n  is  fixed in the context, be the number of 
occurrences  of Qi  in  e n.  Let C(en), or simply c, be the number of different 
Qj's for which ni(en) > 0; i.e. C(en) = I {Qi/ni(en) > 0} I. H(en), or simply H, 
is the singular hypothesis that the next experiment (the (n + 1)th) will result 
in one of the elementary outcomes that do not occur in en or, for short, in a 
new  elementary  outcome.  H(en)  therefore  corresponds  to  the  outcome 
(Qi/rti(en) = 0}. ffl(en) is the hypothesis that one of the elementary outcomes 
that  have  already  occurred  will  occur, ffl(en)  corresponds  to  the  outcome 
{Qi/ni(en) >  0}.  Of  course  we  have  that  ni(eo) = O,  c(eo) = 0  and  H(eo) 
corresponds to T. 
Let W be  a non-empty subset of T. C~,,  (n) is the (finite) hypothesis that 
the result of n  experiments is such that all members of If have occurred (at 
least  once)  and  no  others.  Cw(n)  corresponds  to  the  set  (en ETn/Vi 
[ni(en) > 0 ~  Qi E W] }.  Note  that  Cw(n)  is  empty iff n <  [ W I. Cw  is the 
infinite  hypothesis  that  in  an  infinite  continuation  of the  experiments the 
elements of If will all occur and no others. Cw will be called a constitutional 
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this is a subset  of the infinite  Cartesian product I4/WW ....  Sw is the infinite 
hypothesis  that  precisely  w  elementary  outcomes will  occur in  an  infinite 
continuation  of the  experiments.  It is called the structural hypothesis of size 
w and it corresponds to Ui wl=wCw. 
Later on it will be  convenient to have a separate notation for an arbitrary 
constitutional  hypothesis  of  size  w:C  w.  Let  Cw(en)  indicate  that  C w  is 
compatible  with  e n.  Of course  we have: Cw(en) iff en E  W n. Note that the 
number  of Cw's  compatible  with  en  is  equal  to~K-c}ifc(en)=C<~W, 
\ W 
otherwise it is 0 
To  simplify  probability  expressions  we  will  use  the  following  abbrevia- 
tions 1 : 
Cwen  : Cw A  e n  TTT .... 
which is equal to 
Cw 0  e n  WWW ....  because C w  C  WWW .... 
Note that Cwen is non-empty iff Cw is compatible with e n. 
Swen  :  U  Cwen, 
IWl=w 
which is equal to the same union restricted to those W for which Cw(en) (and 
I Wl=w). 
Our  concern  will  be  restricted  to  regular  consistent  probability patterns 
with respect to T, T 2 , T3,...  : a real-valued function p  on T, T 2 , T 3 ,...  and 
their power sets ~s such a pattern if for all n >  0 
A1 ~  p(en) >  0  for all e n E  T n 
A2  Z,  P(en) = 1 
e n E  T 'n 
A3  ~  P(en Qi) = p(en)  for all en E  T n (consistency) 
Q i~7 ' 
A4  p(En) =  ~  P(en)  for alle  n C  T n 
enEEn 
The  extension  theorem of Kolmogorov guarantees that  such a pattern has a 
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TTT ....  Of course this extension is such that 
B1  P(Cw) >1 O,  for all W C T, and consequently 
p(Sw) =  Z,  p(Cw)>10,  for allw = 1,2 .....  K. 
IWl=w 
Moreover,  from  the  fact  that  the  constitutional  hypotheses as well  as the 
structural hypotheses are mutually non-overlapping and together exhaustive it 
follows that 
K 
B2  Z,  P(Cw) = 1  and  Z  p(Sw) = 1 
WCT  w=l 
The standard definition of conditional probability will be used: ifA and B 
are subsets of the same set then p(A/B)= p(A A B)/p(B), provided p(B)4: O. 
Probability  expressions will  be  written  as  simply as possible. The following 
examples will suffice to illustrate the method: 
p(affen)  : p(enai[enT)  (=p(enai)/p(en)) 
p(aiQi/en)  : p(enaiQ]/enTT)  (=p(enaiQj)/p(en)) 
p(ai/enl~)  : p(en(H (~ Qi)/entq)  (=p(ai/en)/P(H/en) if n i > O) 
All  the  foregoing  expressions  remain adequate  if en  is  replaced by Cwe  n. 
Finally we shall use the abbreviations: 
p(Cw/en) : p(Cwen/enTTT..  .),  p(en/Cw) : P(Cwen/Cw). 
The  product  rule,  i.e.  repeated  application  of  the  equality  p(enQi) = 
p(en)" p(Qi/en) ,  shows  that  a  consistent  probability pattern  is  completely 
determined as soon as all 'special values' p(Qi/en) (including p(Qffeo) = P(Qi)) 
are specified. Note that A1 implies moreover that they have to be positive. 
3.  THE BALL-MODEL AND THE CONDITIONS  OF ADEQUACY 
Consider a ball of which every point on its surface is coloured by one of the 
colours  Q1,Q2 .....  QK.  The  experiments  are  random  throws  and  the 
(elementary) outcome of an experiment is the colour of the point of contact 
when the ball has come to rest. Let the objective probabilities be equal to the 
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the surface then it has a positive objective probability. Let all this be the only 
information  at  the  start  of  the  experiments  and  let  the  outcomes  of the 
consecutive experiments be the only new information we come to know. 
Our aim is to construct a consistent probability pattern with respect to the 
outcomes  which  is  based  on  'rational'  principles  and  satisfies  certain 
minimum conditions of adequacy derived from the general requirement that 
we  want  'to  learn  from  experience'.  In the  ball-model the  following  four 
general conditions are both plausible and precise. 
CA1  Positive instantial relevance: 
p(a~!/en Qi) ~> P(Qi/en) 
CA2  Relative frequency convergence (Reichenbach-axiom): 
If ni/n  approaches  a  limit,  then p(Qi/en)  has to  approach the 
same limit. 
CA3  El~tinative and enumerative relevance: 
p(Cc/enH) = 0; p(Cc/enffi) > p(Cc/en) 
(Co :indicates  always the unique  constitutional hypothesis of size 
e compatible with en) 
CA4  Constitutional convergence: 
If, after a  finite number of experiments, c remains constant then 
p(Cc/en) has to approach 1. 
At this point it is difficult to formulate CA4 in a more precise way; below we 
will  see how this condition can be satisfied in a perfectly clear way. Note that 
the first part of CA3 is satisfied in any consistent probability pattern as soon 
as p(enH) >  0, for CeenH is empty. Observe, moreover, that the second part 
of CA3 as well as CA4 can only be satisfied ifp(Ce) > 0. 
Suppose that there occur on the ball precisely the colours belonging to the 
subset  W of T. ]~en according to our assumptions the objective probability 
that  in  the  long  run  precisely  these  colours  will  occur  is  1.  Hence  it  is 
acceptable in this application to interpret Cw as the hypothesis that precisely 
the colours of I4/occur on the ball. 
Another application is the following urn-model. An urn contains at least K 
balls; each ball has one of the colours Q1,  Q2 .....  Qx and the experiments 
are successive random drawings with replacement. The only problem with this 
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to be no possibility, in the patterns to be studied, for using the information 
that the objective probabilities are rational fractions. 
The application intended by Carnap is essentially this urn-model but then 
with random drawings  without replacement. More precisely, he assumed that 
the  Qi's  constitute  a  family  of mutally  exclusive  and  jointly  exhaustive 
predicates with respect to a randomly ordered countable universe. It will be 
clear that in this application, if the universe is (denumerably) infinite, Cw is 
equivalent  to  the  universal  hypothesis  that  all  individuals  of the  universe 
exemplify only predicates belonging to W and that each of these predicates is 
actually exemplified. It is for this reason that we call the Cw'S (and the S w's) 
also universal hypotheses. If the universe contains only a finite number of N 
individuals, the  described hypothesis corresponds to  Cw(N).  In  this  paper, 
however,  we  shall  only  pay  attention  to  the  case  that  infinitely  many 
experiments are in principle possible and also intended. 
4.  CARNAPIAN SYSTEMS AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN 
ACCEPTABLE GENERALIZATION 
The continuum of inductive methods (Carnap,  1952) is the set of consistent 
probability patterns for which there is a real number X, 0 <  X <  0% such that 
(1)  p(Qi/en) = (ni + X/K)/(n + X). 
The  parameter  X  is  determined  as  soon  as  one  special  value,  for  which 
ni=/=n/K,  has  been  specified,  somewhere  between  min(ni/n,  I[K)  and 
max(ndn ,I[K). 
Kemeny (1963) has  shown that (1), and therefore the complete pattern, 
can  be  derived  if  the  following  material  principles  are  added  to  the 
probability axioms: 
POI  Principle of Order Indifference: 
P(QiQi/en ) = p(Q/Qi/ e  n). 
PRR 3  Principle of Restricted Relevance (or h-principle): 
p(Qi/en) = f(ni, n). 
The proof is repeated in the appendix, together with other related proofs. In 
fact, these principles leave room for the extreme value X = ~o and, ifp(en) = 0 
would  be  allowed,  also  for  the  extreme  value  X = 0.  The  pattern  corres- INDUCTION AND UNIVERSAL HYPOTHESES  261 
ponding  to  a  particular  finite  positive  parameter  value  will  be  called  a 
Carnapian syste:m. 
It is easy to verify that any Carnapian system satisfies CA1 and CA2. It is 
also well-known, however, that a Carnapian system does not satisfy CA3 and 
CA4. This is due to the fact that p(CK) = 1 (which will be proved later on). 
For this  does  not  only imply that p(Cw)  = 0 if w q:K (because of B2), but 
also  that  p(CK/en)  = 1  and  p(Cw/en)  = 0  for all en  and  w :#K.  It  is  now 
immediately  seen  that  the  condition  of  enumerative  relevance  is  never 
satisfied and that the condition of constitutional convergence is only satisfied 
for c = K, but only in a trivial sense. 
It has frequently been said that p(CK) = 1 implies that a Carnapian system 
attaches  the value 0  to all non-trivial universal hypotheses. But observe that 
CK  is in  fact not  a  trivial hypothesis:  it excludes the possibility that some 
elementary outcomes are in fact not realizable by the experiments. 
Carnap  and  many  others  have  held  the  opinion  that  it  would  not  be 
possible to generalize the continuum in an acceptable way such that CA3 and 
CA4  become  satisfied.  And  so Carnap drew the dramatic conclusion that it 
was not the task of pure science to pursue universal hypotheses and theories 
but rather to assign probabilities to finite hypotheses. 
In our opinion the main requirements for a satisfactory generalization of 
Carnap's continuum are: 
R1 
R2 
R3 
R4 
It has to be based on 'rational' principles:  there have to be good 
reasons for accepting them. 
The  principles  have  to  be  finite:  they have  to  impose  general 
functional  relations between probability values concerning finite 
numbers of experiments (as e.g. POI and PRR). 
Parameters  have  to  be  finite:  their  determination  has  to  pre- 
suppose  only  considerations  with  respect  to  a  finite number of 
experiments (as X). 
It has to satisfy the conditions of adequacy CA1 .....  CA4. 
More than ten years ago Hintikka construed the so-called combined system 
(or,  more  generally,  the  a-X-continuum)  and  he  proved  that  this  system 
satisfies the conditions of adequacy (see Hintikka, 1966). Though he had not 
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seemed perfectly clear that such a reconstruction of the system would bring 
out that R2 and in any case R3 were violated. 
It is a plausible conjecture that the apparent violation of R2 and R3 by the 
a-X  system  was  one  of  the  main  reasons  that  Hintikka  and  Niiniluoto 
presented,  in  1974,  a  new  approach  (see  Hintikka  and  Niiniluoto,  1976). 
They  proposed  to  replace PRR  of the  Carnapian  systems by the, likewise 
finite, principle: 
WPRR  Weak Principle of Restricted Relevance (or c-principle): 
p(Qi/en) = fe(ni, n). 
They argued  that,  in the first place, WPRR is at least as defensible as PRR. 
They  also  showed  that  the  resulting  systems, here  called  P-systems, satisfy 
R3:  their  parameters are  finite.  Moreover they  could  not  only prove that, 
under certain conditions, CA1  and CA2 are generally satisfied, but also that 
CA3  and  CA4  are  satisfied  for the  case e = K -  1.  Finally they sketched a 
proof for the  claim that CA3 and CA4 are generally satisfied. In sum, these 
new systems seemed to fulfill all the requirements R1 ....  , R4. 
Hintikka and  Niiniluoto  concluded  that this new approach made it clear 
that  it  was,  in  principle,  possible  to  give  an  axiomatic  foundation  for 
inductive strategies with respect to universal statements. However, the exact 
relation  of the  new  systems to  the  Carnapian systems remained unclear, at 
least with regard to the admissible range of the new parameters. This fact was 
connected  with  an  apparent  general  feature  of the  new  systems:  in  sharp 
contrast  to  the  Carnapian  systems,  the  new  systems  seemed to  be  extra- 
ordinarily complicated. This feature made it hard to obtain much quantitative 
insight  in  the  systems,  which  explains  why  the  analysis  of  Hintikka and 
Niiniluoto was mainly restricted to qualitative considerations. 
In this  paper it  will be  shown that  the  class  of P-systems is coextensive 
with the  class of what  we  shall  call Q-systems. These Q-systems are in fact 
those  members of Hintikka's a-X system in which X(w) is proportional to w 
but  without  Hintikka's particular  choice  of the  prior distribution p(Cw) in 
terms of ~t. The Q-systems contain the Carnapian systems as extreme cases in 
a straightforward way. They satisfy all four conditions of adequacy, and the 
equivalence  theorem implies that they can be based on finite principles and 
finite  parameters.  The  equivalence  theorem  of  course  also  implies  that 
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However, in our opinion the defining principles for Q-systems are, apart from 
their  infinite  character,  very  reasonable.  Finally,  the  mathematical  'mac- 
hinery' of Q-systems is highly transparant; it is as simple as could reasonably 
be expected. 
To justify the title of this article we confine ourselves, apart from proving 
all  claims, to  the  remark that  the  weak principle  of restricted  relevance is 
obviously the  slightest weakening of Carnap's principle of restricted relevance 
for  which  there  are  good  reasons:  the  occurrence  of a  new  elementary 
outcome  falsifies an initially possible universal state of affairs. WPRR leaves 
room for the possbility to change our pattern in case of such events. 
5.  P-SYSTEMS 
In this section we shall treat P-systems in a direct way as far as is necessary to 
prove  the  equivalence  theorem.  The  content  of this  section  is  essentially 
contained in  the  paper by Hintikka and  Niiniluoto, but the presentation is 
rather different. 
Def.  1  A  Pg-system is  a  consistent  probability pattern  with  respect to 
T, I "2, T 3 ....  satisfying the principles 
POI  p(O,Qi/en) = p(a/ai/en) 
WPRR  p(Qi/en) = fc(ni, n). 
The  following notational  conventions will  be very useful:  since p(H/en)= 
(K-e)fc(O,n)  we  may  replace  p(H[en)  by  h(n,e)  and  P(H/en) 
(= 1  -  p(H/en) --: 1  -  h(n, e)) by g(n, e). Of course we have h(0, 0) = p(/-/) = 
p(T) = 1  and  h(n,K) = 0  for  n N K.  Moreover  the  requirement  that  all 
p(Qi/en) have to be positive implies: 
(2)  0<h(n,c)<l  0<c~<min(K-l,n). 
On  the  basis  of  (2)  it  is  easy  to  show  that  WPRR  is  equivalent  to  the 
combination of the three principles: 
PR1  p(H/en) = h(n, c)(=af 1 -  g(n, e)) 
PR2  p(Qi,/en H) = (p(Qi/en)/p(H/en))  = 1/(K -  c), ni = 0 
PR3  p(Qi/enfi) = (p(Qi/en)/p(Ft/en))  = kc(ni, n), ni > O. 264  THEO A. F. KUIPERS 
)~n, ni) (of 
T 1  In a Pg-system there is a real number p, -1 <  p ~< ~, such that 
(3)  p(Qi/enF1) = (ni + p)/(n + cp) (= kc(n i, n)), n i > O. 
The proof of this theorem, which is given in the appendix, is to a great extent 
similar to the proof of (1) from POI and PRR. 
In  this  article  we  shall  only  study  P-systems, which  are, by definition, 
Pg-systems in which 
(4)  0 <  0 < 
Note that, because g(n, K) = 1 (n >~ K), kx(ni, n) and fK(ni, n) correspond to 
the Carnapian system) if p is replaced by X/K. 
T2  A  P-system is, in  addition  to p,  completely determined  by the 
(K-1)  (finite)  parameters h(e,c),  c=1,2 .....  K-I,  or  by 
g(n, 1),  n = 1, 2 .....  K-  1.  (This  does  not  imply  that  any 
choice of them in accordance with (2) is adequate. See section 8.) 
Proof."  From  POI  and  WPRR  follows:  if  rti>0  and  n I  =0  then 
p(QiQi/en) = g(n, c). kc(ni, n). h(n + 1, e). (1/(K -  c)) = p(QiQi/en) = h(n, c). 
(1/(K -  e)). g(n + 1, e + 1). kc+ 1 (ni, n + 1). Substitution of (3) and g(n, e) = 
1 -  h(n, c) gives us the recursive relation, for 1 ~  e <  rain(n, K -  1), 
h(n, c)  n + cp 
n+l  +(c+l)p  (5)  h(n+l'c)="  (1-h(n+l,c+l)) 
That  all h(n, c)  are  now  determined  by the  first set of parameters is easily 
seen  by  starting the  calculation  for c = K-  1 and n = K-  1, K, K + 1 .... 
which  is  possible  because h(n,K) = 0  (n >~K).  That  the  second  set  is  also 
prepared  for  this  purpose  is  seen  when  (5)  is  rewritten  as  equation  for 
g(n+l,c+l)  and  the  process  is  started  for  c+1=2  and  n =1.  The 
parameters are obviously finite. From PR1,2,3 and T1 it now follows that all 
special values are determined, and therefore the pattern,  a Q.E.D. 
The second set of parameters has only been given to show that the h(c, c)'s 
are not the only possible simple (finite) parameters. In what follows we shall 
however  take  these  h(c, c)'s  as  parameters;  but  first  let  us introduce  the 
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6.  Q-SYSTEMS; ALL Q-SYSTEMS  ARE P-SYSTEMS 
The  constitutional  hypotheses  are  mutually  non-overlapping  and  together 
exhaustive with respect to TTT ....  This enables us to construct a consistent 
probability pattern  by specifying (absolute) probability values for the Cw's 
and  for  each  Cw  a  consistent  probability pattern  with  respect  to  W,  W  2, 
W3,...  under  the  condition  Cw.  The  absolute pattern is then obtained by 
conditionalization according to the rule of Bayes. 
In  the  following  definition  we  shall  lay  down  restrictions  on  the 
conditional  patterns  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  equal  for  constitutional 
hypotheses of the same size; for this reason we may replace the index 'C  w' by 
Def. 2  A  (!-system is  a  consistent  probability pattern  with  respect  to 
T, 7 e , T 3 ....  satisfying the axioms: 
Q1  qcw(Qi/en) = qw(Qi/en) =fW(ni, n)  s , Cw(enQi) 
Q2  q w (QiQj/en) = q w (ajai/en) 
Q3  qw(Qi/en  ffl) -- qv(Qi/enffI), ni >  0 
Q4  q(Cw) = q(Cw). 
According  to  Q4  constitutional  hypotheses  of  the  same  size  get,  in  a 
Q-system, the same value, therefore we have: 
(6)  q(Sw)=(K)q(Cw), 
and,  in  combination  with  Q1,  it  follows  that  any reference  to  particular 
subsets W of T may be avoided. 
Let us first consider the conditional patterns more in detail. 
T3  For the conditional patterns of a Q-system there exists a unique 
real number P, 0 <  0 ~< oo such that, except for w = 2 and c = I, 
(7)  qw(Qi/en) = (ni + o)/(n + wp). 
The  exception,  which  is  equivalent  to  the  case  w = 2  and  n i is n  or 0, can 
easily be restored by adding to Q1 in Def. 2 the simple condition: 
QI.1  f~(1, 1) = f2(1, 3)/(4f2(1, 3) -  1), 
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The proof of T3 is given in the appendix. Note that the proofs of (1) and 
(7) are to a large extent similar, for Q1 and Q2 correspond to PRR and POI in 
Carnapian systems when w is replaced by K. Up to section 9 we shall assume 
(8)  0<p  <oo 
T3  says, in effect, that each particular conditional pattern is a Carnapian 
system. Therefore we now have the important theorem: 
T4  For the conditional patterns of a Q-system holds 
(9)  qw(Cw) =1;  qw(Cv)=O  l<~v<w 
Proof.-  (Added  only  for  the  sake  of  completeness.)  Note  first  that  the 
theorem is trivial for w = 1. Let 14/(I W I = w >  1) be a particular subset of T 
and  let  V  be  a  proper  non-empty  subset  of  W(I V [=v).  Because  0~< 
qw(Cv) <~ qw(VVV...)  it is sufficient to prove that qw(VVV.  • .) = 0. From 
(7) it follows that if e n E  V n, then qw(V/en) = (n + vp)/(n + wp). By the pro- 
duct rule we get 
oo 
qw(VVV.  . .) =  II  n  +  vp  _  ~I  1  (w  -  v)p 
n=O rl + Wp  n=O  n + wp 
A  well-known  theorem  says  that  the  last  product  converges  to  a  finite 
non-zero value if and only if the series 
oo  (w -  v)p 
n=O  n + Wp 
converges. But this series is obviously comparable with 
l/n, 
rt=l 
which  is  well-known  to  be  divergent.  Because  the  factors  in  the  original 
product  are  positive and  monotone  increasing  to  1 this  product  has to  be 
finite and non-negative; and hence it is 0, Q.E.D. 
T4 leads us directly to 
(10)  qw(en) = q(en/Cw) 
and therefore to 
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Proof  of  (lO):  q(en/Cw)  is  by  definition 
conditionalization  q(Cwen) becomes 
Z  q(Cv)qv(Cwen). 
O=W  O  --  W 
equal  to  q(Cwen)/q(Cw).  By 
Now 
qv(Cwen) = qv(Cw)qv(en/Cw). 
The conclusion then follows by (9), Q.E.D. 
From  (10)  and  (11) it  follows that we may write all conditionalizations  in 
terms of q(en/Cw) and q(Qi/Cwen), which also makes the  formulas easier to 
read. Let us firs~ reformulate (7): 
(12)  q(Qi/Cwen) = (ni + p)/(n + wp). 
Direct consequences of (12) are: 
(w -  c)o 
(13)  q(H/Cwen) - 
n +wp 
1 
(14)  ni -" 0  : q(Qi/CwenH) = -- 
W--C 
With the abbrev~iation 
n +cp 
q(R/Cwen) - 
n +wp 
ni > O" q(Qi/CwenH) -  ni + p 
n +cp 
r~(n, x) = x(x + 1)(x + 2) .....  (x + n  -  1),  7(0, x) = 1, 
in which n is a positive integer and x  a real number, we also obtain from (12), 
by the product rule, 
(15)  q(en/Cw)  =  II ~(ni, p)/rl(n,  wp) 
i 
Now it is a small step to: 
T5  A  Q.system is, apart from P, completely determined by the K  -  1 
(infinite) parameters q(Cw)  , w = 1,2 .....  K  -  1 ; they have to be 
(nonnegative and) such that 
K 
q(Cw) <  1. 
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Proof:  By conditionalization we obtain, using (15), 
(16)  q(en) =  ~,  q(Cw)q(en/Cw) 
W=C  C 
= II rl(ni, p).  ~  q(Cw)/~(n, wp) 
i  w=c  ¢ 
The theorem follows now directly from 
Y,  q(Cw) = 1 
W=I 
and the requirement q(en) >  0 for all c ~< min(K, n), Q.E.D. 
The special values q(Qi/en) can now directly be obtained from (16) by the 
equality q(Qi/en) = q(enQi)/q(en), but it is not worth while to write this out. 
Since q(Cw/en) = q(Cw), q(en/Cw)/q(en) we obtain from (15) and (16) the 
following, important, result 
(17)  q(Cw/en)= [q(Cw)/~7(n,  wp)]/Iv~=e  (K-_Cc)q(Cv)/Z~(n, vp) ] 
Note that q(Cw/en) depends only on w, n and c. 
The following theorem is one of the main results of this paper: 
T6  Q-systems  are  P-systems;  and  the  parameter  p  in  a  Q-system 
corresponds  to  the  parameter  p  in  the  P-formulation  of that 
system. 
Proof." POI  is  directly  provable  by  conditionalization of q(QiQj/en)  and 
subsequent application of Q2.  By conditionalization and substitution of (17) 
and (13) we get: 
(18)  q(H/en) =  1~  q(Cw/en)q(H/Cwen ) 
W=C+I  W 
X  (K-~)  q(Cw)  (w-c)p 
_  w=c+l  r~(n, wp)  n +wp 
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Therefore q(H/en)  depends only on n  and c, which proves PR1. For the sake 
of completeness we specify also q(ffl/en);  it can be obtained in the same way 
from (17)  and (13), but of course also from q(H/en)  = 1 -q(H/en)  and (18): 
K  (K-c)q(Cw)  n+cp 
E 
(19)  q(~/en)  _  w:e  w-  c  r~(n, wp) " n  + wp 
E 
v:e  ~7(n, vp) 
Analogous  to  the  way  in  which  we  obtained  (18),  by  conditionalization 
from (14) and u~ing that 
~_,  q(Cw/en)  = 1 
W=C  C 
we finally arrive at: 
(20)  q(O~den H) = 1/(K -  c),  ni = 0 
(21)  q(Q~!/enffI)  = (ni + O )/ (n + co),  n i >  0 
PR2 is verified by (20). PR3 is obviously implied by (21). This completes the 
proof that a Q-system is a P-system. Comparison of (3) and (21) shows that 
the O of the Q-system corresponds to the 0-parameter in its P-formulation. Of 
course it was for this fact that we used the same letter, Q.E.D. 
7.  ALL P-SYSTEMS  ARE Q-SYSTEMS 
This section will be devoted to the proof of the following theorem: 
T7  All P-systems are Q-systems. 
One way of proving such a theorem is of course to show that a P-system 
satisfies the  Q-axioms.  It  turned  out  to  give no essential problems to show 
that  a  P-system  satisfies  Q2,  Q3  and  Q4.  Moreover we  could  prove  that 
pw(Qi/en)  is a function of at most w, ni, n  and c. But we had to give up the 
attempt to show the final step leading up to QI: that pw(Qi/en)  depends only 
on  w, n, n i  and  not  on c.  (But  of course,  if our  claim is  true, it  must  be 
possible to prove this last step, too.) 
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way. The main idea behind  this proof is as follows. We start from a P-system 
(with  0  finite  and  positive) and  try to construct a Q-system with the same 
special values. If we succeed, this is sufficient; if we do not succeed, we shall 
attempt  to  show  that  there  is  something wrong with the P-system, namely 
that it is not probabilistic. 
From (3) and (21) we see  that a necessary condition for a Q-system to be 
equivalent to a given P-system is that it has the same parameter-value O. This 
fact will be incorporated in what follows. 
Let Q1, Q2, Q3 ....  , QK be an arbitrary enumeration of all K elementary 
outcomes. Let ec  c be the evidence QI Q2 Q3 • • • Qc (1 ~< c ~< K). In a P-system 
holds, because of PR1, PR2 and the product rule: 
(22)  p(eee) - 
h(0,0)  h(1,1)  h(2,2)  h(c-l,c-1) 
K  K-1  K-2  K-(c-  1) 
m(K__C) !  c-1 
II  h(m, m). 
K!  m =o 
Since we  are  trying  to  construct  a  Q-system in which, among other things, 
C  m  C  p(ec) -  q(ec), we define, on the basis of (16), the following set of K equations 
E(c) (c = 1, 2 .....  K) withK unknowns, X(w) (w = 1, 2,...  ,K): 
E(c)  2  -  II  h(m, m). 
w=e  c  K!  m =o 
Note first that, because h(O, 0) = 1, E(1) can be transformed into 
(23)  2;  X(w) = 1. 
W=I 
Note  further  that  E(K)  has  only  one  unknown  (X(K))  and  that  E(e) 
(e = 1, 2 ....  , K-  1) has one unknown more than E(c + 1), viz. X(e). Hence 
the set of equations has a unique  solution satisfying (23).  Suppose now that 
this solution is non-negative, i.e. that 
(24)  X(w)>tO  w = 1, 2,...  ,K-  1. 
Since we have assumed h(m, m) to be positive it follows that X(K) is always 
positive. 
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can be used as parameter values for the q(Cw) in a  Q-system. Now consider 
the  Q-system determined by the parameters p, q(Cw) = X(w). T6 tells us that 
this  Q-system  is  also  a  P-system.  From  (16)  and  (22)  it  follows  that 
p(e  e) = q(eCc) and hence that q(H/e  c) = h(c, c). T2 excludes that there are two 
different P-systems for which this holds: hence p -= q. 
Now let us set aside our assumption that the solution is non-negative, and 
w=c+ 1  ~(n, wp)  n + wp 
(25)  h x (n, c) - 
K-c 
v~c  v  -  c  ~(n,  vp) 
This  definition  was,  of  course,  suggested  by  (18).  Because  p(eCc+l)= 
(1/(K -  e)) h(e, e). p(eCc) it follows directly from the equations E(c) and (25) 
that 
(26)  hx(c,c)=h(c,c),  c = 1, 2 ....  ,K-  1 
Now consider the recursive relation (5). It can be checked that, if for some n 
and  c,  h(n,c)=hx(n,c)  and  also  h(n+l,  c+l)=hx(n+l,  c+l)  then 
h(n + 1, c) = hx(n + 1, c). In other words, (25) is the explicit solution of (S), 
symbolically: 
(27)  h(n, c) = hx(n, c),  c = 1,2 .....  min(K, n). 
(This general  result  is in  fact  not  surprising  for, under  the  restriction  of a 
non-negative solution, it is an immediate consequence of the, already proved, 
fact that in that case the P-system is a Q-system.) 
Suppose now that the solution of the equations E(c) does not satisfy the 
non-negative  condition  (24).  That  is,  let  X(w)  be  negative  for  some 
w= 1,2 .....  K-1.  Let  u  be  the  largest  index  for  which  this  holds.  It 
follows  from  (25)  and  (27)  that the numerator of h(n, u) is positive for all 
n ~> u. Its denominator becomes negative as soon as 
?_,  x(v)  < -X(u). 
v=u+t  r/(n, 
Because  -X(u)>0  this  inequality  holds  when  n  is  large  enough,  for 
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~(n, up)/~(n, vp) approaches 0 for v >  u  (the proof of this limit-behaviour is 
essentially contained in the proof of T4), and therefore the whole left-hand 
sum approaches 0 by increasing n. We may conclude of course that, as soon as 
this happens, h(n, u) is  negative, and this is in conflict with (2). Therefore, 
our apparent P-system is not a probability pattern and, consequently, it is not 
a genuine P-system. 
8.  CARNAPIAN  SYSTEMS ARE EXTREME SPECIAL CASES OF 
Q-SYSTEMS,  AND Q-SYSTEMS SATISFY THE CONDITIONS OF 
ADEQUACY 
The established  equivalence between P- and  Q-systems enables us to study 
P-systems in  their  'Q-garb'.  But we may of course also  use  symbolizations 
which were introduced for P-systems, such as h(n, c), g(n, c). In the context 
of a  particular Q-system we shall  call the Carnapian system with X = Kp  'its 
(corresponding) C-system'.  The  following theorem will  clarify the  relation 
between a Q-system and the corresponding C.system. 
T8  1  If q(CK) <  1, then: 
q(H/en) < (K -  c)p/(n + Kp)  c <-< rain(n, K -  1) 
q(H/en) > (n + cp)/(n + Kp)  c <~ rain(n, K -  1) 
q(Qi/en) < p/(n + Kp)  ni = 0  c <~ min(n, K -  1) 
q(Qi/en) >(ni +p)/(n +Kp)  ni >0  c ~  min(n, K-  1) 
2  Ifq(CK) = 1, then the Q-system coincides with the C-system 
(i.e. all inequalities in 1. become equalities, including the case 
c= K) 
Proof of 1 :  The first inequality follows directly from (18) and the fact that 
(w -  c)p/(n + wp) < (K -  c)p/(n + Kp) if c ~< w < K. The rest of the theorem 
gives trivial consequences of this inequality, (20) and (21). 
Proof of 2:  This follows directly from (18), (19), (20) and (21). 
It might be thought that the requirement that the parameters h(c, c) may 
not be larger than the corresponding C-values ((K -  c)p/(c + Kp)), guarantees 
that they give rise to a (probabilistic) P.system. This is, however, not the case. 
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(positive) values for the parameters h(c, c} are determined by the requirement 
that  the  equations  E(e)  should  lead  to  a  non-negative  solution.  This 
requirement  is  easily  seen  to  be  stronger  than  the  requirement  that  the 
parameters may not be larger than the corresponding C-values. 
It is  nevertheless possible  to give  a simple, sufficient, but not necessary, 
condition  which  guarantees  that  the  equations  have  a  positive  solution 
(X(w) > O, w = 1,2 .....  K),  and therefore that the parameters give rise to a 
(probabilistic) P-system. 
T9  The condition 
O<h(e,e)<p/(e+(e+l)p)  e=l,2  ....  ,K-1 
quarantees a positive solution for the equations E(e). 
Proof:  Note  first  that  X(K)  is  positive  and  smaller  than  1.  Because  c+l  p(ec+x) =p(e~)h(e, e)/(K -  c) it is possible to derive from E(e) and E(e + 1) 
that 
x  ( K-c'/  rl,c, wp),,  *wp)n,c,  (w--c)p  )  /(C):: w=e+lZ  e|Pil,w)~l.~e~---~e.  ~  1 
It  is  easy  now  to  check  that X(e)> 0  if the  condition mentioned in  the 
theorem  is  combined  with  the  inductive  hypothesis  that  X(w)> 0,  w = 
c + 1 .....  K, Q.E.D. 
Now we shall  start to investigate the behaviour of a Q-system in the light 
of the conditions of adequacy that were introduced in section 3. At the same 
time  we  will  derive some  other important characteristics of Q-systems.  In 
what follows we shall assume that the q(Cw)'s are all positive. It will be easy 
to check whether the inequality-sign' <' has to be replaced by' ~<' or by ' =' if 
this assumption is not (generally) satisfied. The proofs for the theorems will 
only be sketched. 
We  shall  start  with  the  condition  of enumerative relevance (CA3, part 
two). 
(28)  q(Cc/e.7   > q(Cc/e.). 
(Follows directly :from (17).) An important consequence of (28) is 
(29)  •  q(Cw/enff-I) <  Z  q(Cw/en). 
W=C+ I  W=C+ 1  • 274  THEO A. F. KUIPERS 
(The sum  of the lefthand terms  of (28) and (29) as well as the sum of the 
righthand terms must be 1  .) 
(30)  q(H/enfi  r) < q(H/en). 
(From  the  first  formulation  of  (18);  use  the  fact  that  (13)  implies 
q(H/Cwenffl) < q(H/Cwen); finally, use (29).) 
As counterpart of (30) we have: 
(31)  q(ffl/enFI) > q(ffI/en). 
From (21) we immediately obtain 
(32)  q(ai/enaTh  r) > q(ai/enF1),  n~ > O. 
Now we are in a position to verify CA1: 
(33)  q(ai/enai) > q(ai/en). 
(For n i = 0 directly from T8.1. For n i ~> 0 it follows from (31) and (32).) 
Now let us  turn  to the limit behaviour. The expression 'q(../en) ~  L' 
always indicates that q(../en),  conceived as real-valued function, has L as its 
limit if n goes to infinity (c remaining constant). 
CA4  follows  immediately  from  (17)  and  the  fact  that  if v >  c,  then 
rl(n, cp)/71(n, vp) ~  O, which was proved in the proof of T4. Hence we have 
(34)  q(Cc/en)  c>  1;  q(Cw/en)  c >0, w>c. 
From (34) we easily get 
•  "-----+ 0.  (35)  q(R/en )  c>  1,  q(H/en)  c 
(Start  from the  conditional formulation of q(H/en)  in  (18); use q(H/Cwen) 
c ~ 0 if w >  c, which is based on (13); finally, use the second part of (34).) 
The  Reichenbach-axiom  (CA2)  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
Q-system  is  applied  to  experiments  for which  ni/n  (for all  Qi)  goes  to  a 
certain  limit,  say qi.  It  is  well-known  that  i.t is  problematic whether  this 
assumption  is  mathematically  acceptable,  but  the  intuitive  meaning  is 
perfectly clear. The following results have the same shortcomings: 
(36)  If ni/n ----~ qi >0, then q(Qi/enffD --£-+ qi. 
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(Directly from (21).) 
(37)  If ni]n ~  qi, then q(Qi/en) ~  qi. 
(For qi = 0  and  r/i =  0  this  follows  directly  from (35).  For the other cases: 
combine (35) and (36).) 
Note that in the  ball-model of section  3  we assumed that if the colour Qi 
occurs  on  the  ball,  then  qi>O.  In  this  case  the  assumption  of  the 
Reichenbach-axiom  implies that c will tend to a limit, so that we may replace 
(37) by: 
(38)  If for all i either n i = qi =  0 or ni/n ~  qi ~> O, then 
q(Qi/en) ~  qi. 
9.  EXTREME  CASES 
In  the  preceding  sections  we  restricted  our  attention  to  2 <K  <  ~  and to 
finite  positive  values  for  p.  In this  section  we  shall  make  some claims and 
remarks about w]~at happens ifp or K  takes an extreme value. The claims will 
not  be proved  for their proofs are very similar to the proofs in the preceding 
sections.  The expression  'P-system' (or 'Q-system') will be used  to refer to a 
system  fullfilling  all  requirements  for being  a  P-system  except  perhaps  the 
condition that P(en) has to be positive. 
Claims:  -  P-systems with p  = ~  are Q-systems with p  = ~, and vice versa. 
-  Q-systems with p  = ~  and in which all q(Cw) are positive satisfy 
CA1, CA3 and CA4 generally; however, they violate CA2. 
Remarks:-  We  have  separated  this  case  only  because  the  formulas  get  a 
different form. 
-The  Carnapian  system  with  p  = ~  violates  all  conditions  of 
adequacy (p(Qi/en) is always 1/K). 
K=2. 
Claim:  All  theorems  about  P-  and  Q-systems hold  for K  = 2  if we add 
the  principle  of linearity:  in  case  of  P-systems:  if c = 2  and 
ni ~> 0,  then  p(Qi/enff-1)  is  a  linear  function  of ni,  in  case  of 
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Remarks: -  It is well-known that the  derivation of the  Carnapian systems in 
case K = 2  requires also the related principle: p(Qi/en) is a linear 
function of ni. 
-  The addition of the principle of linearity to the Q-axioms makes 
QI.1 superfluous. 
-  Axiom  Q3  does  not  imply any  restriction  in  case K = 2;  it  is 
therefore superfluous. 
g  ~oo 
Claims: 
Remark: - 
-If  q(Sw)  ,  w = 1, 2 ....  and  p  are  taken  as  parameters  in  a 
Q-system  such  that  Z~v=lq(Sw) <<. l,  we  get  a  completely 
acceptable  pattern  with  respect  to  denumerably infinite  many 
K-c 
elementary  outcomes.  (Notice  that  the  expressiOn(w_c ) 
q(Cw),  which  occurs  in  all  conditionalizations,  is  equal  to 
-  The  corresponding P-systems can be obtained by taking g(n, 1), 
n = 1, 2 ....  and p as parameters. 
-  The equivalence-theorem remains valid and these systems satisfy 
the  conditions  of adequacy  in  the  same way  as  systems with 
finite K. 
In  these  systems  it  is  much  easier  to  give  new names to  the 
elementary outcomes  when they  occur  for the  first  time.  It is 
only in this reformulation that such systems satisfy p(en) > O. 
fl=O. 
Claims: 
Remark: - 
'Q-systems'  with  p = 0  are such that qw(Qi/en)  =  ni/n,  but they 
are inadequate because q(H/en) = O. 
All  'Q.systems' with p = 0  give  rise  to  the  same  pattern as the 
corresponding Camapian extreme case: the so-called straight rule 
p(Qde.) = ndn. 
We  do  not  know what 'P-systems' with p = 0 look like. We did 
not  succeed in finding the explicit solution of (5) for this case; 
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straight rule, is a solution. Our conjecture is that this solution is 
the  only one for which p(en)  is never negative, but it might also 
be 1:he case that there are several interesting solutions. 
-1 <p<O. 
Claim:  -  'Q-systems'  with  p<O  are  inadequate  because  they  imply 
q(t~r/en) <  O. 
Remark:-  We  do  not  know  whether  'P-systems'  with  -l<p<0  are 
adequate.  Apart  from particular values of p  in this interval, the 
equations E(c) have a unique solution such that (25) remains the 
explicit  solution  of (5).  But  it  is difficult  to  find  out  in what 
cases, if any, (25) leads to positive values forp(H/en).  Ifp takes 
certain  rational  values  (p =-v/w  for  some  v,w  such  that 
1 ~< v <  w ~< K), then not all equations are adequately defined. It 
is  however  our  conjecture  (in  fact  strong  conviction) that  all 
'P-systems' with -1 < p <  0  are inadequate  for the same reason 
as  such  'Q-systems':  there  will be  numbers n  and  c  such  that 
p(H/en) <  O. 
10.  CONCLUSION 
The  main  conclusion of this article is of course that Carnap's continuum of 
inductive  methods  can be  generalized  in  a  completely acceptable way. The 
result is the class of Q-systems, with parameters 
p(O <  p  <  °°), 
and 
q(Cw), w  = l, 2, . . . ,K-  1  q(Cw) <  1  . 
1 
We propose to call this class  'the stratified continuum of inductive methods', 
for  obvious  reasons.  The  equivalence-theorem  tells  us  that  this  stratified 
continuum can be founded on 'rational' and finite principles and also that its 
members can  in  principle  be characterized  by finite parameters. The direct 
analysis  of  Q-systems  shows  that  they  behave  in  accordance  with  the 
conditions of adequacy for individual and universal hypotheses based on the 
intuitive notion  of 'learning from experience'. To be precise, all members of 278  THEO A. F. KUIPERS 
the  stratified  continuum  satisfy the  conditions  for individual hypotheses as 
well  as  the  condition  of  eliminative  relevance  for  universal  hypotheses 
unrestrictedly.  They satisfy moreover the universal conditions of enumerative 
relevance  and  constitutional  convergence for all  Cw  for which  q(Cw)> O. 
Finally,  the  stratified  continuum  contains  the  Carnapian  continuum  as 
extreme case: q(CK) = 1. 
The  importance  of  the  equivalence-theorem  is  of  course  primarily 
foundational.  What  has  been  shown  is  that  choosing  non-trivial  initial 
values  for  the  Cw's,  which  seems  intuitively  not  acceptable  from  'an 
inductive point of view', is not at all objectionable. Given a particular initial 
distribution  (for the  Cw's) we can calculate, by solving the equations E(c) in 
the  reverse way,  essentially  finite  probability values that would give rise  to 
the  same  pattern  if they  were  taken as parameters in the P-formulation. In 
other words, the  Q-system approach is completely acceptable from a finitary 
(inductive) point of view. 
Fortunately,  the  Q-system  approach  is  not  only very attractive  from a 
technical  point  of  view,  but  it  also  seems intuitively  more  satisfactory to 
deliberate  about  the  choice  of the  initial  distribution,  for apart  from the 
apparent, but refuted, objection we shall, at least to our opinion, in general 
have more clear intuitions  about the initial  distribution than about the finite 
parameters in the P-formulation. 
A main task for further research seems therefore to be the development of 
suggestions  for  initial  distributions.  In  our  opinion  the  choice  has  to  be 
related  to  the  particular  type  of  application  under  consideration  and  to 
additional information -  if present -  with respect to the application, that is: 
to  information which  is  not  already built into the probabilistic framework. 
To give  an  example:  we  might  know  not only which elementary outcomes 
may occur but also that there will, with objective probability one, occur, at 
least so and so many elementary outcomes. 
As to  the  application intended  by Carnap,  viz.  a  randomly ordered and 
denumerably  infinite  universe,  Hintikka's  (one-parametric)  a-distribution 
(Hintikka,  1966) is very attractive as soon as there are reasons for letting the 
initial  probability of Cw  monotone  increase with w. In Kuipers (1976), we 
have  proposed a two-parametric distribution which leaves room for this and 
many  other  qualitative  relations.  By  the  appropriate  choice  of the  two 
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there are reasons for doing so on logical, statistical or metaphysical grounds. 
Let us  conclude this article by reformulating the distribution which has 
been  proposed  by  Carnap  in  a  discussion  about  Hintikka's  a-distribution 
(Carnap,  1968). An initial distribution can of course not only be specified by 
the  initial  values  for  the  constitutional  hypotheses  (or  constituents,  as 
Hintikka has called them) Cw but also  by the initial values for the structural 
hypotheses (or constituent-structures as Carnap has called them)S  w, for we 
obtain then the first values by q(Sw) ~-- (;)~/(C~).  Carnap's proposal was  may 
\--[ 
essentially to apply the intuitive principle of indifference to the Sw's: give all 
of them the same  initial value and therefore the value 1/K. As is well-known 
the  Carnapian  ~ystem  with  X=K,  or,  equivalently, O = 1,  is  such that  all 
'statistical descriptions' (i.e. for a given n, the class of series en with the same 
ni's  is  one such description) get the same value. For p = 1 this remains true 
for all conditional patterns and all statistical descriptions compatible with the 
corresponding C  w.  In our opinion the Q-system with the initial distribution 
which was  proposed by Camap  (q(Sw) = l/K) and with the value 1 for the 
parameter 0 is the most sophisticated way in which the classical principle of 
indifference can be applied in a truely inductive way. 
University of Groningen, 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains a combined proof of T.1  and T.3. The proof of 4(1) 
(i.e.  (1) of section 4) from POI and PRR is also included. We shall frequently 
apply the division-operation; that it is allowed is always essentially based on 
A1 of section 2. 
Step 1 
First, consider a  conditional pattern qw of a Q-system. From Q1  it follows 
that 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
qw(H/en) = (w -  c)fW(O, n) 
qw(Qi/enI-I) = 1/(w -  c),  ni = 0 
qw(Qi/enff-I) =fW(ni, n)/(1 -  (w -  c)fW(O, n)),  n i > O. 280  THEO  A. F.  KUIPERS 
Hence qw  satisfies the three principles PR1, PR2 and PR3 of a P-system with 
K  = w.  Moreover  Q2  corresponds  to  POI.  Therefore:  qw is a P-system with 
K=w. 
Step 2 
Second,  consider  a  P-system  (K >  2).  From  POI  it follows, by the  product 
rule, that 
(4)  if ni >  0, nj >  0 (and ni + n] ~< n -  e  +  2  if c  >  2  and n i + n i  =  n  if 
¢  =  2) 
p(H/en)p(Qi/enI-I-)p(H/en Qi)p(QffenQiff-l)  = 
p(H/e n)p(Qffenffl)p(H/e" Qj)p(Qi/en QjFI) 
which may be transformed, on the basis of the PR-principles, into 
(5)  kc(ni, n)kc(ni, n + 1) = kc(nj, n)ke(ni, n + 1). 
From the probability axioms follows also: 
(6)  ~,  p(Qffenffi) = 1. 
i :ni >0 
From PR3 we get the special cases of (6): 
(6.1)  kc(n -  c + 1, n) + (c -  1)kc(1, n) = 1 
(6.2)  ke(n-c+l,n+l)+ke(2,  n+l)+(c-2)ke(1,n+l)=l. 
Let c >  2; substitution  of n i =  1 in (5) gives, for 1 ~  n i ~  n  -- C +  1, 
(7)  ke(ni, n)kc(1, n +  1) = ke(1, n)kc(ni, n + 1). 
Substitution ofn i = n  -  c + 1 resp. n i = 2 leads to the special cases: 
(7.1)  kc(n -  c + 1, n + 1) = ke(n -  c + 1, n). kc(1 ' n + 1) 
kc(1,n) 
k¢(2, n) 
(7.2)  kc(2, n + 1) = kc(1 ' n--------)"  kc(l' n + 1). 
Substitution  of (7.1) and (7.2) in (6.2) gives: 
/(ke(n-c+l'n)kc(2'n)  )ffc-(1.~  -- 
(8)  kc(X,n+l)=l  +kc(1,n-----~ +c-2 INDUCTION AND UNIVERSAL HYPOTHESES  281 
and by substituting (6.1) in (8) we obtain: 
(9)  kc(1, n  + 1) = ke(1, n)/(1  + kc(2, n) -  kc(1, n)) 
With the following definition of ;kc 
(10)  kc(1, c + 1) ~f (1 + XJc)I(c +  1 + x~) 
we are now in a position to prove: 
(11)  for fixed c > 2  and  l  <~ ni <~ n  -  c + l , it holds that 
kc(ni, n) = (ni + ;kd~)/("  + XD. 
Inith~l  step:  n  = c + 1; therefore  n t = 1  or  = 2; kc(1, c + 1)  satisfies  (11) by 
definition; that kc(2, c + 1) satisfies (11) now follows directly from (6.1). 
Inductive  step:  suppose (11)holds for fixed n t> e + 1, it then follows from 
(9)  that  it  holds  for  ke(1, n + 1)  and  finally from (7) that it holds also  for 
kc(n i, n  + 1),  1 (  ni ~< n -  c + 1.  This  completes  the  proof of (11) as far as 
n~c+  l. 
Final step:  that the claim is true for n = c, i.e. kc(1, c) = l/c, follows directly 
from (6) and PR3. 
Step 3 
Let c f> 2; from POI, the product rule and the PR-principles it is easy to show 
first that p(QiH/en) = p(HQi/en) for n i >  0 and subsequently that 
(12)  g(n,c)kc(ni, n)h(n + 1,c)= h(n,c)g(n + 1,e + 1)kc+l(ni, n  + 1). 
Substitution  of c = 2 in (12), using (11) for c = 3, leads to the conclusion that 
k2 (hi, n) (1 ~< ni <- n  -  1) is of the form F(n). (hi + ;ka/3)/(n + 1 + ;ks). From 
(6)  it  follows  that  k2(ni, n) + k2(n -  n i, n) = 1.  This  implies  that  F(n) = 
(n + 1 + ;k3)/(n + 2/3. ;ka),  and  therefore,  with  ;k2 = dr2/3 • ;k3,  we  may 
conclude  that  (11)  holds  also  for c = 2  and  1 <~ni ~<n -  1. Note that (11) 
holds trivially for c = 1. 
From  (7)  it follows that kc(ni, n)/kc+l (ni, n  + 1) may not depend on n i. 
Hence ;kc/C has to be a constant for all c = 2, 3 .....  K, say p. Hence we have 282  THEO  A. F. KUIPERS 
now generally: 
(12)  ke(n i, n) = (ni + p)/(n + co),  1 <~ ni ~  n -  c + 1. 
The necessary and  sufficient  condition  which will guarantee  that kc(ni, n) is 
always positive is easily seen to be -1 <  P ~< oo. It is also easy to see that this 
condition  ascertains  that ke(ni, n) is never larger than  1, and this completes 
the proof of T.1. 
Step 4 
In  step  1  we  argued  that  the  conditional  patterns  qw  of  Q-systems  are 
P-systems with w =K. Hence we may interpret  the proof of (12)as follows: 
(13)  for each w>2thereisarealnumberPw,-I  <Pw ~< °° such that 
qw(Qi/enfI) = (ni + ow)/(n + cow), 1 < ni < n  -  e + 1. 
From axiom  Q3  it now follows that Pw is a constant,  say p. Substitution  of 
this result in (3) gives (w >  2) 
(14)  fW(n i, n) = (1  -  (w -  c)fW(O, n)). ((nt + p)/(n + cp)), 
l<.ni<~n-c+l. 
Because ]W(ni, n)  may  not  depend  on c, it now follows, by comparing (14) 
for a  fixed value of c  (2 ~< c <  w) with c +  1, that f~(O, n) = p/(n + wp), and 
therefore we have, for w >  2, that for all ni 
(15)  fW(ni, n) = (n i + p)/(n + wp),  0 <~ n i <. n 
From Q3 and (13) it also follows for 1 ~< n i ~  n -  1, that q2 (Qi/en fI) is equal 
to  (ni +p)/(n +20).  However,  our  argument  from  (14)  to  (15)  cannot  be 
applied  here  since  we  cannot  compare  two  values  for  c>~ 2.  Consider, 
therefore, the relation from Q1 and Q2: 
(16)  f2(O,n+  1)=f2(0, n).f2(n,n+  1)/f2(n,n). 
Since  for  c = 2,  q2(Qi/enft) =q2(Qi/en),  we  have  f2(n, n + 1) = (n +p)/ 
(n + 1 + 2p).  Suppose now that f2(0, n) = p/(n + 2p); then  we have not  only 
that f2(n,n)= (n +p)/(n +2p)but  from  (16)  we  can  also  conclude  by the 
relevant  substitutions,  that f2(0, n  + 1) = p[(n + 1 + 20).  Combined  with the 
special  axiom  QI.1,  which  implies  that f2(O,  1) = p/(1 + 2p),  we obtain  the 
result  that f~(0, n) = p/(n + 2p), for all n.  On the basis of (14)  we now con- INDUCTION  AND UNIVERSAL  HYPOTHESEO~  283 
clude  that  (15)  holds  also  for  w  =  2.  Note  that  (15)  is  trivial  for  w  =  1. 
Finally, it is easily seen from (15) that the  condition 0  <  p  ~< oo is necessary 
and sufficient to  guarantee that fW(n  i, n) is probabilistic; and this completes 
the proof of T.3. 
Step 5 
The principles POI and PRR correspond to Q1  and Q2. It is easy to check that 
the proof of (15) for a  given w  >  2  does not depend on the application of Q3 
just  prior  to  (14).  Therefore,  substitution  of  X =wp  in  (15)completes  the 
proof of (1) of section 4  for K  = w  >  2. 
NOTES 
*  The author wishes to thank Professor A. J. Stare for his stimulating suggestions during 
the  research and Professor E. M.  Barth, Doctor J. F. A. K. van Benthem and Professor 
J. J. A. Mooij for i!heir comments on the first draft. 
**  At the end of the research for this article the author received from Professor Itkka 
Niiniluoto his first draft  of a  paper entitled 'On a  K-dimensional system of inductive 
logic' (i.e.  on the system of P-systems in the present article). Some passages in that paper 
are  closely,  though only implicitly, related to  the  equivalence theorem,  which is the 
central core  of the present paper.  The paper of Professor Niiniluoto wiU appear in the 
Proceedings of the 1976-PSA-meeting, Vol. 2. 
1  For simplicity we shall write 'en' , even when the set containing only the n-tuple e n, 
{ en}  , is intended. 
It  is  technically  convenient  to  require  regularity,  that  is  to  say,  to  exclude  the 
possibility that p(en) may be zero. 
3  This formulation of a  principle or  axiom  has to  be interpreted as:  the probability 
value may only change if at least one of the arguments occurring at the right side changes. 
4  Note that, for alln and e, h(n, c) can be calculated in a finite number of steps. 
s  This symbolization should not be misunderstood as  the w-th power off(ni, n); the 
index, w, indicates only a possible dependency on w. 
Note  1  added  in pro@  An implicit assumption  in  the proof in Section 7 is that the 
solution of the eq~ations E  (c) is such that the denominator in (25) is always non-zero. 
Suppose  that  this  is  not  true.  Let c=-co<K  be the  largest c  and,  for this c,  n=n0+l 
(>%)  the  smallest n  for which  the  denominator of (25), i.e.  of hx(n o +l,co),  is zero. 
It can be checked now that hx(n o ,c o)=1  and that the proof of (27) remains valid for all 
n  and e  for which either e>e  o or e=c  0  and  c 0 <n<n  0 . But this implies that h(n o ,c o )=1, 
which  is  in conflict with  (2).  Hence,  for  a  genuine P-system  the  equations E(c)  are 
such that the denominator in (25) is always non-zero, 284  THEO A. F. KUIPERS 
Note 2  added  in proof." The  class  of Q-systems  is  of course a subclass  of the class  of 
systems  that  arises  if Q3  is  deleted  in  Def.2  of Section 6.  In Ch.VI of our Studies in 
Inductive  Probability  and  Rational  Expectation  (Synthese  Library  123,  Reidel, 
Dordrecht,  forthcoming)  this  comprehensive  class  of  inductive  systems  is  studied 
extensively:  axiomatic  foundation,  mutual  relations,  inductive  properties,  objective 
models and infinite extensions.  In Ch.V the same is done with respect to a large class of 
Carnapian-like systems in which, however, P(Qi) need not be equal to 1/K.  In this book 
the logicoqinguistic approaches to inductive logic have been replaced by a set-theoretic 
approach  to  rational  expectation  in  contexts  of  theories  and  experiments  and  to 
suitable  probability  systems.  In  Ch.VII  precise  characterizations  are  given  of  the 
contexts in  which  Q-systems  (and  Carnapian  systems)  can be  applied inductively, i.e. 
as rational expectation pattern. 
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